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According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional 
objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua 
thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of 
intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of 
the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will 
point out, (ST) has the ontological consequence that the 
intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what 
there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good 
metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for 
independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if 
there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about 
of things of that kind are not really committed to such things. 
Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia 
that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua 
first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may 
really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong 
to good metaphysical kinds. 
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There are intentionalia of which it is true that such objects do 
not exist 
 
According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional 
objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua 
thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of 
intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of 
the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will 
point out, (ST) has the ontological consequence that the 
intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what 
there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good 
metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for 
independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if 
there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about 
things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace 
Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are 
really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order 
property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be 
intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good 
metaphysical kinds. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In § 1, I will 
present Crane’s conception of intentional objects as schematic 
objects. In § 2, I will outline two main consequences of Crane’s 
schematism, one ontological and the other metaphysical: first, that 
there really are only some intentionalia, i.e., those that fall under 
good metaphysical kinds, and second, that thoughts about the 
intentionalia that are really not there involve no relation at all to 
such objects. In § 3, I will say that Crane’s criterion to 
ontologically ‘divide’ genuine thought-of entities from merely 
pseudo- thought-of entities – or better, to divide thoughts that are 
really related to intentionalia from thoughts that are not such – in 
terms of the existence vs. nonexistence of the relevant 
intentionalia is different from the criterion I provide, which 
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appeals to whether an intentionale falls or not under a good 
category. For there are intentionalia that fall under a good 
category and yet do not exist. Finally in § 4, I will try to answer 
some objections to my ontological criterion. 
 
1. Intentional objects as schematic entities 
 
In recent works (2001a, 2001b; see also 2012) Tim Crane has 
maintained that intentional objects, the objects intentional states, 
or thoughts,1 are about, are schematic objects; as Crane says, 
“intentional objects […] are […] objects in a schematic sense” 
(2001a:17). This is a metaphysical thesis, i.e., a thesis on the 
nature of an entity, or as it may also be formulated, a thesis on 
what kind of entities some entities are, provided that there are 
any;2 specifically, a thesis on the nature of intentionalia. 
According to this thesis – let me call it the schematicity thesis 
(ST) – insofar as they are thought-of, intentionalia have no 
particular nature. In other words, qua target of a thought, what 
that thought is about, an intentionale has no nature.  
Intentionalia are therefore not merely intentional objects, if 
this means that intentionalia are so-called objects-of-thought, i.e., 
entities of a particular nature, which can further be grasped by a 
given metaphysical theory. Classical examples of how one can 
conceive intentionalia as mere intentionalia are the following. 
First of all, intentionalia may be taken as immanent entities à la 
Brentano (1924), i.e., entities that both modally and temporally 
depend for their own being on the being of the thoughts that 
conceive them: necessarily, if there is an intentionale, then there 
1 Following Crane himself  (2001a:39), I will here draw no difference between intentional states and 
intentional events, i.e., between mental particulars without a temporal part and mental particulars with a 
temporal part. A fortiori, I will draw no difference between intentional states or events and intentional 
acts, the latter traditionally counting as intentional events under an intentional description. Let me call 
thoughts all such mental particulars. 
2 For this understanding of a metaphysical thesis, cf. e.g. Thomasson (1999). 
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is the thought that conceives it; that intentionale perdures for as 
long as that thought does. Alternatively, intentionalia may be 
taken as abstract entities, i.e., entities that necessarily fail to have 
either a spatiotemporal location or genuine causal powers, for 
they necessarily have either a non-spatiotemporal dimension or 
non-genuine causal powers – in Meinong’s (1971) terms, they 
subsist.3 These abstracta may be further taken to be either 
thought-independent entities, free idealities – Zalta (1988) – or 
thought-dependent entities, at least in the already explained modal 
sense, bound idealities – Thomasson (1999), McGinn (2004), 
Moltmann (2012).4  
Yet Crane’s thesis does not rule out that intentionalia do 
have natures; simply, it states that they do not have such natures  
as intentionalia. This means that one can think of objects of 
whatever metaphysical kind – the category, to use with Crane a 
different and venerable word for such a kind – she likes. Simply, 
the fact that an object is an object of that kind is not determined 
by the fact that one thinks of it. So, (ST) has not only a negative 
but also a positive side stating that intentionalia have various 
natures that are settled utterly independently of the fact that such 
intentionalia are thought of. As Crane himself points out, one can 
think of concrete individuals – Jimmy Carter – as well as of 
events – the Iraqi-Iranian war; moreover, one can also think of 
things belonging to an institutional world, such as nations – Iraq, 
Iran – and so on. All these objects are different in nature, they fall 
3 This conception is not Meinong’s. If Meinong is taken as a defender of a metaphysical approach to 
intentionalia as mere intentionalia, then for him intentionalia are entities that neither exist nor subsist. 
Yet since Meinong thought that objects are given before they are thought of, then one may take him as a 
sort of precursor of Crane’s ST (even though, unlike Crane, he would admit all intentionalia in the overall 
domain). In this perspective, for Meinong an intentionale may be a concrete actual entity, a concrete 
possible entity, a concrete impossible entity, or an abstract entity, depending on which of any such entities 
is really thought of in the thought involving such an intentionale. 
4 The distinction between free and bound idealities comes from Husserl (1948:267), but it can also be 
found in Ingarden (1931). Following Ingarden (1931), Thomasson (1999:89) literally calls mere 
intentionalia “purely intentional objects” and distinguishes them from ordinarily existing intentionalia. In 
the same vein, by mere intentionalia McGinn (2004) and Moltmann (2012) mean nonexistent intentional 
objects, which for them are rather mind-dependent entities. 
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under different categories, but they are not different insofar as 
they are all thought-of.5 
 
2. Consequences of schematism6 
 
I think Crane’s conception of intentionalia as schematic objects 
has a number of theoretical advantages. From the metaphysical 
point of view, it seems to me the right way to approach the issue 
of what are intentionalia. As Sainsbury (2010) also points out, to 
postulate a new metaphysical class of exotica in order to account 
for the ‘directionality’ of our thoughts sounds rather ad hoc. Yet I 
also think that ST, taken as the idea that the nature of an 
intentionale is not settled by its being thought-of, has some 
consequences one of which, as I shall try to show, may not be 
welcomed by Crane.  
To begin with, ST has an epistemological consequence: the 
nature of an intentionale is not transparent to the subject who 
thinks of it, in the sense that one can be wrong as to the nature of 
an intentionale one is thinking of. Consider mythological entities, 
such as the old Greek gods or Santa Claus. In thinking of them, 
believers in them erroneously take them to be entities belonging 
(at least also) to the natural world, whereas in point of fact they 
are fictional entities of a particular kind; namely, ficta that do not 
depend on a particular creator (you can trace back Sherlock 
Holmes to Conan Doyle and Anna Karenina to Leo Tolstoy, yet 
the creative processes of Apollo and Santa Claus are, as 
Thomasson (1999) would put it, diffuse)7.  
Although Crane does not say anything about this 
consequence, I think he would have no qualms in endorsing it. 
Yet more interestingly for my present purposes, ST also has, 
5 Cf. Crane (2001a:15-17). 
6 This paragraph elaborates things originally said in Voltolini (2009). 
7 Cf. Thomasson (1999:7,140fn.3). 
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along with some other ontological theses on categories, an 
ontological consequence. Suppose we take ST in its positive 
import – namely, that intentionalia have various natures, i.e., fall 
under different categories, each of which is settled independently 
of their being thought of. Suppose moreover that, from an 
ontological point of view, it turns out that, in the general 
inventory of what there is, the overall domain,8 there are no 
things of the category an intentionale falls under. Hence, in that 
domain there utterly are no intentionalia of that category. Vice 
versa, suppose that things of that category figure in that domain; 
then, in that domain there also are intentionalia of that category.9 
For instance, suppose that – to stick to one of Crane’s own 
examples – one thinks of Jimmy Carter, who is (at least) a 
concrete entity. Since concrete entities figure in the overall 
domain, then in that domain there really is an individual identical 
with Jimmy Carter. Yet now suppose that one thinks of Jimmy’s 
imaginary companion, what Jimmy pretended to play with when 
he was a kid; let me call it Jommy. Metaphysically speaking, 
entia imaginaria are posits of mere imagination, typical mind-
dependent entities if there are any. Since we don’t have entia 
imaginaria in our overall domain – what figures in such a domain 
is just a child’s pretend play with them – then there is really no 
such thing as Jommy.10 
8 By equating the overall domain with the general inventory of what there is, I do not mean that domain as 
an universe of discourse, as Crane (2011a) would be prompted to take it. For unlike an universe of 
discourse, the members of the overall domain are genuine entities. 
9 In order for this consequence to follow, when people say “things of category C exist” (for instance, 
“ficta exist”), such a saying does not have to be taken as meaning “there is at least one C”. As Fine would 
put it, such a saying displays a universal, not an existential commitment, i.e., a commitment to all Cs. 
Thus, it means “All things of category C exist”, where “exist” expresses a first-order property of 
existence. Cf. Fine (2009:167). In the light of what I will say later, I add that this is not a substantial, but 
a formal first-order property of existence: i.e., a property that is both universal and such that possessing it 
makes no difference for the thing that has it (for more details on this distinction between different 
existential first-order properties, cf. my Voltolini (2012)). 
10 As to entia imaginaria so conceived and the reasons for rejecting them, cf. Kroon (2011). In order to 
understand what follows, it is crucial that entia imaginaria are not fictional entities. 
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Thus, not all objects of thought are admitted in the overall 
domain, only those that fall under so to speak to good 
metaphysical kinds, to categories whose members are in that 
domain. A further metaphysical consequence of this overall 
predicament is that defenders of ST have to tell a credible story as 
to what the structure of thoughts really is. Phenomenologically 
speaking, it sounds as if, insofar as it has an intentional object, 
any thought has a given relational structure, i.e., it involves a 
relation with one such intentionale. Yet since at least in the case 
in which a thought has an intentional object that is not admitted in 
the overall domain there really is no such thing, and moreover, 
there obviously cannot be relations without relata, that 
phenomenological appearance cannot match the real structure of 
that thought.  
Adverbialists à la Kriegel (2008) would say that, despite its 
relational appearance, for that thought to be about an intentionale 
when there really is no such thing amounts for that thought to 
merely having a certain monadic property; such a property can be 
further described in adverbialist terms. So in apparently thinking 
of Jommy, Carter’s imaginary companion, one is merely thinking 
jommywise.11 Now, Crane shares Kriegel’s idea that, for the 
afore-mentioned reasons, being about an intentional object is not 
a relational property.12 Yet he is not that radical. According to 
him, when it turns out that there really is no intentionale a given 
thought is about, then that thought can still be sorted out as that 
particular thought in terms of that intentionale. As he puts it, the 
fact that two thoughts are about different intentionalia that are 
such that there really are no such things “does not mean that the 
thoughts are the same” (2001a:25); although both such 
intentionalia are nothing, the first thought is about the first 
11 Kriegel (2007, 2008) says that the same also holds for an intentionale that is such that there really is 
such a thing, such as Jimmy Carter: in apparently thinking of Jimmy, one rather thinks Jimmily. But this 
complication is irrelevant for my present purposes. 
12 This idea is sketched in Crane (2001a:25-6) and is forcefully reprised in his later (2011b), (2012). 
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intentionale, the second thought is about the second 
intentionale.13 To be sure, Crane goes on saying, the real structure 
of any such thought is not a relational structure involving that 
intentionale as the right-hand side member of the relation, for the 
really is no such thing. Nevertheless, one can still legitimately 
hold that the real structure of that thought is relational. For, 
although there really is no such intentionale, that thought is 
anyway related to an intentional content. So, when a thinker 
thinks about Jommy, provided that there is really no such thing as 
Jommy, that thinker is merely related via her thought to a certain 
Jommyian intentional content. Moreover, in order not to have two 
different types of thoughts – a thought whose structure contains a 
relation of its bearer to no thing, a thought whose structure 
contains a relation of such a bearer to a genuine thing – for Crane 
the same holds also in the case in which an intentionale really 
figures in the overall domain. Although in such a case the thought 
is effectively related to such an entity – the thought refers to it, as 
he has put it recently14 – the structure of that thought remains the 
same as before, i.e., a bearer-thought-content structure.15 In point 
of fact, Crane’s story is reminiscent both of the early Husserl’s 
(1984) and of Searle’s (1983) approach to intentionality, 
according to which the only intentionalia that there are are those 
that exist. Whenever one entertains a thought, she is related via 
that thought to a certain intentional content. This is the real 
13 Crane also says that the thought is individuated in terms of its intentional object, even if turns out that 
there really is no such thing.  Cf. (2001a:29). This terminology is unfortunate, for if an entity is 
individuated in terms of something else, that something else has to figure in the overall ontological 
domain. Soon later in the book, Crane accepts this ontologically committed sense of individuation. For he 
says that a thought is individuated in terms of its intentional content, where the intentional content is 
something the thought is really related to (so, it figures in the overall domain): cf. Crane (2001a:32). So, it 
would have been better if Crane had resorted to an epistemological sense of individuation by saying that a 
thought is identified in terms of its intentional object, in the sense that it is by appealing to such an object 
that we tell that thought from any other thought. As a matter of fact, he explains individuation precisely in 
these terms, i.e., as “distinguishing [an intentional state] from all others” (2001a:31). Yet as I said, this is 
merely a terminological point. 
14 Cf. Crane (2011b:24-5). 
15 Cf. Crane (2001a:28-33). 
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relation that always holds as far as a thought is concerned and 
characterizes its structure. If there really is no intentionale for that 
thought, that’s the end of the story. Yet if there really is such an 
intentionale, then one is also indirectly related in her thought to 
that intentionale, via the fact that the intentional content of that 
thought somehow singles out that very intentionale. 
Now, Crane is right in holding that, at least whenever it 
turns out that there really is no intentionale a thought is related to, 
the thought’s real structure is different from what it appears to be 
– it involves an intentional content rather than an intentional 
object.16 Yet he is not right in drawing the line of division 
between thoughts that are really related to intentionalia and 
thoughts that are only seemingly such in terms of the existence of 
the relevant intentional object. For, as we will see in the next 
Section, endorsing the afore-mentioned ontological consequence 
that follows from ST in its positive import, along with the fact 
that there are good categories, amounts to a way of drawing the 
above line that is not identical with Crane’s own way. 
 
3. Are intentionalia that do not exist mere façons de parler? 
 
As we have just seen, Crane surely endorses the last metaphysical 
consequence, namely that at least whenever a thought is about an 
intentionale that is not in the overall domain, that thought’s 
structure involves no relation with that intentionale. Yet he does 
not seem to also endorse the previous ontological consequence, 
namely the one stemming out of ST in its positive import. I said 
that the only intentionalia that are really there are those that fall 
under good categories; since things falling under any such 
category are in the overall domain, a fortiori there are the things 
16 For the purposes of this paper, I here remain neutral as to whether, whenever there really is the object a 
thought is about, not only the thought is related to that object. but the real structure of that thought is 
made by a relation to that very object. For reasons to believe that, see Sacchi-Voltolini (2012), 
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so categorized that are also thought of. Yet although Crane 
accepts that there is a divide between thoughts that are about 
intentionalia that are really there and thoughts that are about 
intentionalia that are such that there really are no such things, he 
draws that divide where the early Husserl and Searle actually put 
it. That is, when the intentionale is an existent thing, then there 
really is such a thing, so that the relevant thought is really related 
to it (via the proper intentional content). Yet when the 
intentionale is a nonexistent thing, then there really is no such 
thing; existent intentionalia are the only intentionalia that there 
are. Hence, in that case the relevant thought is really related only 
to a given intentional content. For instance, suppose Leverrier 
thinks of Neptune, the planet posited in order to explain the 
perturbation of Uranus’ orbits. Since Neptune really exists, then 
there really is such a thing, so that Leverrier is really related to it 
in his thinking of it (via the proper Neptunian intentional content). 
Yet now suppose Leverrier thinks of Vulcan, the alleged planet 
posited in order to explain the perturbation of Mercury’s orbits. 
Since Vulcan does not really exist – that perturbation can be 
alternatively accounted for, e.g. via Einstein’s theory of relativity 
– then there really is no such a thing. Now, Leverrier’s thought 
can still be sorted out as a thought of Vulcan. Yet since there 
really is no such a thing as Vulcan, that thought is utterly not 
related to it, it is merely related to a Vulcanian intentional content. 
So for Crane, it is not good categories, but it is existence that 
makes the ‘divide’ between ontologically acceptable and 
ontologically inacceptable intentionalia. Let me reframe this point 
in more proper terms, in order not to give the misleading 
impression that there is a line separating things in two groups, the 
intentionalia that are genuine things and those that are just fake 
things – the line simply divides thoughts that are related to 
intentionalia from thoughts that are not such. For Crane, it is the 
existence of an intentional object, rather than its falling under a 
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good category, that lets that intentionale to be admitted in the 
overall ontological domain. 
 Now, if this is the way for Crane to draw such an 
ontological ‘divide’ between genuine thought-of things, i.e., 
intentionalia that exist – say, Neptune – and pseudo- thought-of 
things, i.e., intentionalia that fail to exist – say, Vulcan – 
existence has to be conceived as a first-order property, a property 
of individuals.17  
In the history of philosophy, two main candidates have been 
proposed for existence as such a first-order property: either 
having a spatiotemporal location, an idea recently reprised by 
Williamson (1990, 2002), or being straightforwardly involved 
with a worldly causal order, in the sense of both producing and 
undergoing effects (in short, having genuine casual powers), a 
suggestion coming from Plato down to Meinong (1971) and 
Castañeda (1989). The first candidate entails the second – things 
spatiotemporally located are endowed with genuine causal powers 
– yet it is not clear whether the entailment holds also in the 
opposite direction, since it is not that clear whether having 
genuine causal powers involves being spatiotemporally located.18 
Granted, regardless of how existence as a first-order 
property is understood, it may seem strange to say that Crane’s 
ontological ‘divide’ between intentionalia that are genuine 
entities and intentionalia that are not such presupposes that he 
appeals to existence so conceived. For he never positively 
endorses such a conception. Rather, at least in (2001a,b), he 
explicitly endorses Quine’s (1948) stance on ontology, according 
to which to be is to be the value of a (bound) variable.19 Apart 
from Quine’s nominalism, this is the typical Frege-Russell 
17 This property is a substantial property, for – regardless of whether it is universal, i.e., it is possessed by 
all members of the overall domain – it adds something to its possessor. For more details on this point, see 
my Voltolini (2012). 
18 On this, cf. Berto (2012). 
19 Cf. Crane (2001a:17). In (2011a, 2012) he however tries to put this stance aside. 
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conception of existence as a second-order property, according to 
which a thing of a certain kind exists iff, in the general inventory 
of what there is, there are things of that kind, or in other terms, 
that kind has instantiations. 
 Yet this is not the end of the matter. First of all, Crane 
explicitly recognizes that the Meinongian thesis according to 
which “some intentional objects do not exist”, to which he 
himself seems somehow to be committed, is at least perfectly 
understandable.20 More recently, he has even said that the thesis is 
true; or better, true at most in some sense, for he also adds that, 
properly speaking, there are no nonexistent intentionalia. As he 
explicitly says, “it is not the case that there is anything 
corresponding to the quoted words [i.e., ‘Pegasus’, ‘unicorns’]. 
The words have no reference: there are no unicorns, and no 
Pegasus” (2001a:25).21 Now, whatever Crane believes on the 
Meinongian reading of the Meinongian thesis,22 in order for the 
above sentence expressing that thesis to be both understandable 
and merely in a sense true, in it “exist” must mean a first-order, 
not a second-order, property, as Meinongians hold. Otherwise, 
that saying would be contradictory (it would per impossibile 
mean “there are some intentional objects that are such that there 
are no such objects”). Or, if it meant something utterly different, 
such as “there are thoughts that involve no relation to things”, as 
Crane suggests,23 then for him it would not be something merely 
20 Cf. Crane (2001a:24). 
21 Cf. Crane (2011a). 
22 In (2011a), Crane explicitly states that in order to take one such sentence as intelligible or even (in a 
sense) true, one does not have to commit to the idea that “exists” works in it as a first-order property. In 
(2012) he indeed says that a sentence like “the round square exists” can be both intelligible and even (in a 
sense) true even if it means “there (uniquely) is a round square”. This is correct, yet if the latter sentence 
is conjoined to the former sentence –  as follows: “there are some intentionalia that do not exist: e.g., the 
round square (does not exist)” – in order both for the whole conjoined sentence to be both intelligible and 
even (in a sense) true and for the anaphorical link in it concerning “exists” to hold, that predicate must 
work as a first-order predicate throughout the whole sentence.  
23 As he himself points out in Crane (2001a:25). I thank two referees for having attracted my attention to 
this point. 
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understandable and at most true in a sense; it would have to be 
true, period.  
As I have just hinted at, Crane ultimately denies the 
Meinongian thesis; “I reject it”, he says (2001a:25). Properly 
speaking, in fact, for him it is not really true; if you like, if it is 
true it is such only at a preliminary level – at a way of looking 
things that at most mirrors a phenomenological approach to 
reality – but it is not really true – at the very ground level of how 
things really are.24 Now, the fact that Crane ultimately rejects the 
Meinongian thesis might be taken as further evidence to show that 
he does not endorse the idea that existence is a first-order 
property. Yet for him to hold that the Meinongian thesis is not 
really true is to hold the negation of that thesis, namely the claim 
that there are no nonexistent intentionalia, i.e., that it is not the 
case that there are intentionalia that do not exist – e.g., it is not 
the case that there is a nonexistent intentionale to which the word 
“Vulcan” refers.25 But if this claim is the denial of the 
Meinongian thesis, i.e., its negation, then it obviously preserves 
the intelligibility of the latter thesis by taking it as (really) false. 
As a result, in it the predicate “exists” must again mean a first-
order property of existence. For simply the anti-Meinongian claim 
amounts to saying that, pace Meinongians, the property in 
question is universal – it applies to all things in the overall 
domain – i.e., it is not such that, as Meinongians believe, it 
applies to some but not to all things in that domain. (More or less, 
the predicament here is the same as when one says “there are no 
unopened cans in the fridge”, meaning – against a possible 
opponent of hers – that it is not the case that in the fridge there are 
cans that are not open.)26 Put in another way, in order for the 
sentence “it is not the case that there are intentionalia that do not 
24 Cf. also Crane (2011a, 2012). 
25 Cf. Crane (2001a:17,25). 
26 Cf. on this also my Voltolini (2012). 
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exist” to work as a denial of the Meinongian thesis “there are 
intentionalia that do not exist”, it cannot be a sheer tautology. But 
it would be such if in it “exist” meant a second-order property; the 
sentence would trivially say that there are no intentionalia that are 
such that there are no such objects. 
At any rate, since Crane manifestly thinks that appealing to 
a first-order property of existence is inessential in ontological 
matters, let me put into brackets whether he is really committed to 
such a property. The point remains that the two afore-mentioned 
criteria for having merely some intentionalia within the overall 
domain – Crane’s criterion: existence vs. nonexistence of an 
intentionale; my criterion: an intentionale’s falling under a good 
category vs. an intentionale’s failing to fall under it – are not 
identical. Moreover, the only plausible way to explain this 
criterial difference is to say that an intentionale may well fall 
under a good category, hence it may well belong to the overall 
ontological domain, and yet fail to exist, in the only possible 
sense in which this way of saying is intelligible; namely, the 
Meinongian reading that commits one to existence as a first-order 
property. So, what ultimately makes the ontological ‘divide’ is 
not having vs. not having our first-order property of existence, but 
rather, once again, falling under rather than not falling under a 
good category. Let me expand on this. 
To begin with, let us go back to Crane. For him, the fact that 
we cannot accept intentionalia as such in the overall domain is 
just another way to see that, as ST states, being an intentional 
object is no category at all. For, according to him, in order for a 
kind to be a category, all its members must exist. This is not the 
case as far as the kind being an intentional object is concerned, 
for its putative members are both existent and nonexistent. Thus, 
as soon as we discover a category under which a certain 
intentionale falls, we eo ipso have it ontologically at our disposal; 
as Crane puts it, if an intentional object falls under a certain 
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category, then it exists. Yet conversely, if an intentional object 
does not exist, then it falls under no category, “for all members of 
a given category exist” (2001a:17), hence it is ontologically 
rejected.  
According to this way of putting things, all categories are 
trivially good categories: all categories make it the case that their 
members figure in the overall ontological domain. Yet this does 
not seem to be the case. For, as I said before by appealing to entia 
imaginaria, there are categories whose (putative) members are not 
admitted in such a domain. In this respect, entia imaginaria are 
just a case in point; disembodied souls, entelechys, hypostases 
and other philosophers’ dreams may be others.  
Now, Crane might accept this point by simply saying that 
bad categories (like entia imaginaria) are those whose members 
do not exist, where “exist” supposedly means the second-order 
property. If this were the case, then the two ontological criteria for 
having only some intentionalia in the overall domain – existence 
vs. nonexistence of an intentionale; an intentionale’s falling under 
a good category vs. failing to fall under it – would be the same 
one. But, pace Crane, they are not the same criterion: indeed, 
there are intentionalia that fall under a good category and yet do 
not exist. Moreover, there is just one way to understand what I 
have just said: namely, that in the overall domain there are 
intentionalia – which thereby fall under good categories – that 
however fail to possess a certain first-order property of existence. 
If in saying “there are intentionalia – which thereby fall under 
good categories – that do not exist” the verb “exists” did not mean 
that property, but the second-order one, what I say would again be 
merely contradictory – as if I said that certain intentionalia both 
fall and do not fall under good categories.27 
27 To be sure, Crane might reply that if we say that some intentionalia that are accepted in the overall 
domain and thereby exist (in the second-order sense of the predicate) do not however exist in another 
sense, this sense does involve a first-order property which however is not ontologically relevant; this 
property would just be a property F whatsoever that such intentionalia fail to have – see (2001a:25) for 
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 Let me now argue for the point just stated above – briefly, 
that there are intentionalia that do not exist in a first-order sense – 
by generalizing it, namely by showing that as a first-order 
property, existence is not necessary for something, whether it is 
thought-of or not, to be admitted in the overall domain (or 
conversely, nonexistence is not a sufficient criterion in order for 
something to be banned from that domain). There indeed are 
things that belong to the overall domain yet they do not exist. 
Consider again Neptune and Vulcan. From the metaphysical point 
of view, they are both concrete entities, i.e., as Cocchiarella 
(1982) puts it, entities that may have either spatiotemporal 
location or genuine causal powers. Given the above 
characterizations of existence as first-order property, Neptune 
actually has such location or powers insofar as it actually exists, 
Vulcan actually fails to have such location or powers insofar as it 
does not actually exist. So, they have the same nature, although 
the first actually exists and the second does not. Hence, either 
their shared category, being concrete, makes both of them to 
figure in the overall domain, or neither entity is admitted in such a  
domain. Since we clearly admit concreta in the above sense, we 
then have at our disposal both Neptune and Vulcan, although only 
the former exists in a first-order sense. As a result, qua first-order 
property, existence fails to ontologically distinguish between 
them.28 
To be sure, one may have qualms in conceiving of Vulcan 
as a concretum that is a mere possibile, i.e., as an entity that might 
have existed although it actually fails to exist. Is Vulcan not 
this possible reply. Yet I would retort that i) in this predicament it would nevertheless remain a distinction 
between intentionalia that do not exist in the second-order sense and intentionalia that exist in the very 
same sense and ii) this distinction is utterly parasitic on the distinction between intentionalia that fall 
under good categories and intentionalia that fail to fall under such categories. It is because an intentionale 
falls under a category whose members are accepted in the overall domain that such an intentionale exists, 
in the second-order sense. 
28 Vulcan, of course, is just a case in point. Consider directly the case of an intentionale such as the 
dagger I hallucinate. Since my object of hallucination is a concrete object in the afore-mentioned sense 
and moreover we admit concreta, there really is such an intentionale, although it does not exist. 
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simply a false theoretical posit, hence something which rather 
falls on the side of abstracta rather than on that of concreta?29 
Well, if one has problems with the example, just change it. 
Consider Willy-Volly, the mere possible suit made of one of Tim 
Williamson’s jackets and of a pairs of trousers of mine.30 This is 
precisely a mere possibile in the above sense, which moreover is 
as much a concretum as one of Tim Williamson’s actual suits. 
To say that existence is not a necessary condition for 
figuring in the overall domain does not obviously entail that 
nonexistence is a sufficient condition in order for something to 
figure in that domain. Some of the nonexistents figure in the 
domain, some other do not. Once again, it’s belonging to the good 
category that ‘wears the trousers’ in this respect. Consider again 
Willy-Volly, and in addition both the Platonic ideal Bed and 
Twardy, the impossible wooden cannon made out of steel (this 
example comes from Twardowski ([1894]1982)). All of them do 
not exist in our first-order sense. Yet from the metaphysical point 
of view they are different entities. As I said, the first is a 
concretum that is a mere possibile, an entity that actually fails to 
exist although it might have existed. The second is the prototype 
of an abstract entity, i.e., an entity that necessarily fails to have 
either genuine causal powers or spatiotemporal location. The third 
is an impossibile, i.e. an entity that not only does not actually 
exist, but also it might not have existed. So, these three entities do 
not belong to the same metaphysical kind. Now, as we have 
already seen, concreta, both actual and possible, are legitimate 
entities; mere failure to actually exist does not provide good 
reasons to reject them (cf. Williamson 1998, Voltolini 2007). This 
is also the case of at least some abstracta, typically bound 
idealities, such as e.g. fictional entities, which are a species of 
bound idealities (cf. Thomasson 1999 and Voltolini 2006b for 
29 For this option, cf. e.g. Salmon (2002). 
30 Cf. indeed Williamson (1998:267) for a similar example. 
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attempts at providing reasons for accepting them). Yet 
impossibilia are non-legitimate entities, since we have serious 
grounds to get rid of them: as Russell (1905a,b) insisted, they 
violate Excluded Middle in its propositional form.31 Now, as we 
just saw, all these metaphysically different entities – concreta that 
are mere possibilia, abstracta, impossibilia – do not exist, in our 
first-order sense. Yet, even nonexistence does not distinguish 
among them which is a genuine entity – something that does 
belong to the overall domain – and which is just a pseudo-entity – 
something that does not figure in that domain. What counts is that 
being impossible, unlike both being concrete and being abstract, 
is a bad category: there is nothing impossible that figures in that 
domain. 
If all this is correct, then the ‘divide’ between genuine 
entities (figuring in the overall domain) and pseudo-entities (not 
figuring in it) does not coincide with the divide between existent 
and nonexistent entities (a real divide between genuine entities, at 
this point), hence a fortiori between existent and nonexistent 
intentionalia. In order for something to be a genuine entity, that 
something must fall under a category whose members belong to 
the overall domain. This is utterly independent of whether that 
very something exists or not in a first-order sense. For existence 
in that sense is no metaphysical kind. Thus, if we think of Santa 
Claus, insofar as we have ficta in the overall domain, then there 
really is such a thing as Santa, although it does not exist. Yet 
since we do not have impossibilia, then independently of the fact 
that Twardy, the impossible wooden cannon made out of steel we 
were talking about before, does not exist, there is no such a thing 
as Twardy.  
31 Such impossibilia would be things that per impossibile were such that it is the case that p and it is the 
case that not-p, not things that possess both property P and its complement non-P, i.e., entities that violate 
Excluded Middle in their objectual form. Such entities may well figure in the overall domain, as most 
Meinongians claim. Cf. on this point Simons (1990:182,185) 
 
                                                 
 19 
Of course, it may be questionable which category is good 
and which is bad. A good category is a category whose members 
figure in the ontological domain; yet it may be controversial 
whether one category is really a good one. For one thing, contrary 
to what I claimed before, many people believe that there are no 
such things as ficta; some people even believe that there are 
impossibilia.32 But this is part of the ordinary philosophical 
debate in ontology; ontological arguments or other kinds of 
evidence have to be provided in order to show that a category is 
good (or bad). Now, my thesis that only an intentionale that falls 
under a good category figures in the overall domain is obviously 
conditional on the premise that the relevant category is a good 
one. Should it turn out (by means of the above arguments or other 
kinds of evidence) that such a category is not good, that 
intentionale would not figure in that domain. As a further result, 
we would be forced to reject a story saying that the structure of 
the thought about it is made inter alia by a relation to that 
intentionale. 
 
4. Objections and replies 
 
On behalf of Crane, one may first of all point out that, in order for 
something to figure in the overall domain, what is required is 
simply, à la Quine, that the kind that very something allegedly 
falls under is instantiated. That kind must not be a metaphysical 
kind, something for whose instantiation an apriori demonstration 
is required; an empirical kind, something that calls for a posteriori 
search, may well suit ontological needs. For example, in order to 
positively answer the question of whether there are platypuses, a 
typical empirical kind, one simply needs to look and see; if that a 
posteriori search is satisfied then the overall domain will include 
things that are platypuses, and that’s all. So, even if to exist in our 
32 For arguments against ficta, cf. e.g. Everett (2005); for supporters of impossibilia, cf. e.g. Priest (2005). 
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first-order sense were no metaphysical kind, this would not mean 
that it does not work as a (discriminative) ontological criterion. 
 To begin with, I hold that although being existent, in our 
first-order sense, is not a metaphysical kind, it is a sui generis 
empirical kind. All empirical kinds are existence-entailing 
properties, for instance being a platypus entails to exist in our 
first-order sense. Hence, looking for existent things is quite a 
trivial matter – it is enough to find instantiations of any empirical 
kind whatsoever. Patently, moreover, in order to admit things 
falling under an empirical kind, we have already to accept things 
of the metaphysical kind an empirical kind specifies. For instance, 
in order to admit platypuses, we have already to have concreta in 
the overall domain. If we were solipsists, we would admit just 
disembodied souls – possibly, ourselves only; hence, we would 
not have concreta in the overall domain, a fortiori we would not 
have platypuses. So, even if existence were an empirical kind, it 
would not ultimately be in terms of its possession that something 
would figure in the overall domain. Finally, if an aposteriori 
search gives us instantiations of an empirical kind F, it does not 
obviously allow us to reject putative things that are not F – e.g. 
non-platypuses cannot be ruled out that way (I, for one, am a non-
platypus). A fortiori, no a posteriori search can allow us to reject 
nonexistent things. Indeed, as we saw before, it is not in virtue of 
its nonexisting that something can be legitimately banned from 
the overall domain. 
 Here one must be very careful. True enough, an aposteriori 
search can well help us to reject fountains of youth as well as 
golden mountains.33 But if such a search has that ontologically 
33 Even Meinongians who commit themselves to Meinongian objects such as the fountain of youth or the 
golden mountain must play here some tricks. They have to say either that the properties involved by such 
objects are special properties – the so-called nuclear properties, properties belonging to the respective 
core of those entities (Meinong 1972, Parsons 1980) – or that those objects well possess the ordinary 
properties of being a fountain of youth or of being a golden mountain, yet they possess such properties in 
a special mode – the so-called determining, or encoding, or internal mode (Mally 1912, Castañeda 1989, 
Rapaport 1978, Zalta 1983). 
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negative outcome, this depends on the fact that those properties 
are existence-entailing ones; thus, there is neither a fountain of 
youth nor a golden mountain, for there is neither an entity that is 
both existent and a fountain of youth, nor an entity that is both 
existent and a golden mountain either. Thus, it is not because they 
do not exist that such putative entities are rejected. Rather, they 
are rejected because only things that exist can possess the 
properties of being a fountain of youth or of being a golden 
mountain, so there is no entity which both does not exist and is 
either a fountain of youth or a golden mountain.34 
 Another objection to my point against existence as a 
metaphysical kind comes from the remark that it is notoriously 
hard to find a divide between metaphysical and non-metaphysical 
kinds. Tables of categories are hardly convincing.35 For example, 
I have previously treated being concrete as a metaphysical kind, 
by defining it as being possibly such that it has either a 
spatiotemporal location or genuine causal powers. Now, as we 
have seen before being such that it has either a spatiotemporal 
location or genuine causal powers is actually tantamount to being 
existent. If being existent is, as I have claimed, no metaphysical 
kind, why should being possibly existent be one such kind? In 
general, if being F is no metaphysical kind, being possibly F is no 
such kind either. For instance, being a fisherman is not a 
metaphysical kind, but neither is being a possible fisherman. 
 True enough, some more work should be done in order to 
characterize a metaphysical kind so as to distinguish it from other 
such kinds. For instance, intuitively speaking being abstract and 
being impossible are two such kinds. But if one limits oneself to 
34 For believers in the aforementioned appeal to different modes of property possession (cf. previous 
footnote), this entailment only holds in the satisfying, or exemplifying, or external, mode, which faces the 
aforementioned internal mode. Hence, there may well be an entity that internally is a fountain of youth (a 
golden mountain) that externally fails to exist. 
35 For an interesting attempt at constructing one such table by appealing to different dependence relations 
between items so categorized, cf. Thomasson (1999). 
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qualifying them in terms of having necessarily either no 
spatiotemporal location or no genuine causal powers, i.e., of 
having impossibly either spatiotemporal location or genuine 
causal powers, then one fails to distinguish between such kinds. 
This is why one must add, as I did before, that unlike 
impossibilia, abstracta have necessarily either no spatiotemporal 
location or no genuine causal powers insofar as they necessarily 
have a non-spatiotemporal dimension or non-genuine causal 
powers, i.e., insofar as they necessarily subsist.36 Furthermore and 
more interestingly for my present purposes, some more work 
should be done in order to properly qualify a kind as a 
metaphysical one. For the time being, however, it is enough for 
me to sketch a necessary condition in order for a kind to be a 
metaphysical kind: in order for a kind to be a metaphysical kind, 
one must perform an independent apriori investigation in order to 
settle whether that kind has instantiations, that is, an investigation 
that is neither an a posteriori search nor an apriori search that 
depends on some previous investigation of the same type.37 So, 
not only no empirical scrutiny can help us in settling the question 
e.g. of whether there are fictional entities or numbers, but also one 
cannot argue e.g. for possible fishermen unless one has already 
argued for possible existents in our first-order sense (cf. my 
Voltolini 2007). 
 So far, so good. Yet one might trace back to Crane an 
argument to the effect that being nonexistent is an ontologically 
36 In this very complicated conceptual situation, one has not to be led astray by basically terminologically 
points. Beforehands I have metaphysically distinguished concreta from abstracta by appealing to a 
certain modal distinction: roughly, concreta are the entities that may exist, so that some of them actually 
exist while some others exist merely possibly; instead, abstracta are the entities that necessarily fail to 
exist. Yet one may instead make a similar tripartition by speaking of contingent concreta as flanked by, 
respectively, contingent non-concreta and necessary abstracta (cf. Linski-Zalta 1996). Now, whatever 
terminological choice is good, provided it captures the real distinctions between metaphysical kinds. 
37 I take this way of qualifying metaphysical kinds as a mere necessary condition for being a metaphysical 
kinds. For if this way were also meant as a sufficient condition, it would rule out the standard 
counterexamples for sufficiency, i.e., other apriori yet not metaphysical kinds such as specific mathematic 
kinds, only if one believed that these latter kinds are such that in order to apriori settle whether they have 
instantiations one has to previously settle whether there are mathemata in general.   
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bad metaphysical kind (and conversely, being existent is a good 
such kind). Some of the things he says as regards nonexistent 
intentionalia may indeed be taken precisely as going along this 
direction. First of all, he appeals to the well-known Geach (19822) 
problem of intentional identity: is there a nonexistent individual 
which both Hob and Nob take to be a witch such that Hob thinks 
she has blighted Bob’s mare and Nob wonders whether she has 
killed Cob’s sow? This question, Crane claims, seems to have no 
definite answer. For there seems to be no fact of the matter as to 
whether such different thinkers think of the same nonexistent 
intentionale. Now such an indeterminacy, he also claims, only 
affects nonexistent intentionalia. For whenever existent 
intentionalia are concerned, is fairly easy to establish whether two 
thinkers are thinking of the same thing yet under different 
aspects.38 Now, one might take these claims as gesturing towards 
an argument showing that, since being nonexistent leads to 
ontological indeterminacy, it is an ontologically bad metaphysical 
kind. In a nutshell, all nonexistents are vague things, and there 
cannot be such thing as vague entities. 
 The structure of the argument I tentatively trace back to 
Crane is clear: i) qua nonexistent entities, nonexistent 
intentionalia are ontologically indeterminate; ii) if an entity is 
ontologically indeterminate, then there is no such thing; thus, iii) 
there are no nonexistent intentionalia.39 
 Although premise ii) is contestable,40 I do not want to raise 
any question against it. It follows from Quine’s dictum “no entity 
without identity”. If it is indeterminate whether x and y are the 
same entity, then there is no fact of the matter as to whether the 
overall domain contains either one or different entities; put 
38 Cf. Crane (2001a:30-1). 
39 This argument reminds similar arguments provided by actualists against mere possibilia. Cf. e g. 
Adams (1974). As Crane does not say that all nonexistents are indeterminate objects, the argument cannot 
be properly ascribed to him. 
40 For problems with ii), cf. e.g. Routley (1982), Williamson (2000). 
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alternatively, the identity of an entity is a necessary condition in 
order for it to belong to that domain. Quine’s dictum is the reason 
why it is one thing to settle e.g. whether O and O’ are the same 
fictum, quite another to settle whether there is such a thing.41 
Yet I reject premise i), and I think Crane should reject it as 
well. If intentionalia are schematic objects in the ST-sense that 
they have no metaphysical nature qua thought-of objects, or, 
positively put, the metaphysical nature of an intentionale is settled 
independently of its being thought-of, then the identity criteria of 
an intentionale are given in terms of the identity criteria for 
entities of the category that intentionale falls under. Now, such 
criteria are given independently of whether not only there is such 
a thing as that intentionale, but also, and more importantly for my 
present purposes, that very intentionale exists (in our first-order 
sense) or not. But then it is not the case that there is no fact of the 
matter as to whether two thinkers think of the same nonexistent 
intentionale or not. This depends on whether, given the category 
that intentionale falls under, the identity criteria for entities of that 
category settle whether it is the same entity the two thinkers are 
thinking or not. For example, suppose first that by thinking of O 
thinker T is actually thinking of a fictum and by thinking of O’ 
thinker T’ is actually thinking of a fictum, and second, that 
sharing the same core properties makes O and O’ the same 
fictum.42 Now, a fictional entity does not exist in our first-order 
sense. Yet if O and O’ are ficta sharing the same core properties, 
then given the above criterion of identity for ficta there is a 
positive answer as to the question of whether T and T’ think of the 
same nonexistent intentionale: they think the same fictum. So, 
Socrates is thinking of Zeus, which is a fictional entity whose 
core property is being the chief god, while Cicero is thinking of 
Jupiter, whose core property is exactly the same. Since those ficta 
41 On this cf. Thomasson (1999). 
42 For this idea, cf. e.g. Parsons (1980). 
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share the same core property, they are the same entity. Since 
moreover ficta do not exist in our first-order sense, then Socrates 
and Cicero are thinking of the same nonexistent intentionale.43  
Thus, it is not the case that nonexistents are per se 
ontologically indeterminate entities. A fortiori, if intentionalia are 





Let me sum up. Crane’s metaphysical conception of intentional 
objects as schematic objects is definitely interesting and 
convincing. From this conception it indirectly follows that, as 
Crane rightly argues, not all thoughts that are about intentionalia 
involve a relation with such objects; for not all intentionalia are 
really admitted in the overall domain. Yet the ‘divide’ between 
ontologically acceptable and ontologically inacceptable 
intentionalia (or better, the divide between thoughts that involve a 
relation to such objects and thoughts that only involve a relation 
to an intentional content) is not to be drawn where Crane puts it, 
namely, as a ‘divide’ between existent and nonexistent 
intentionalia. For, pace Crane, not only this way of letting only 
some intentionalia to be admitted in the overall domain involves a 
conception of existence as a first-order property, but it does not 
work insofar as existence is no metaphysical kind. In fact, the 
right way to draw that ‘divide’ is to appeal to a distinction 
between the metaphysical kinds intentionalia fall under. If an 
intentionale falls under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind 
whose members are ontologically accepted, then there really is 
such an intentionale in the overall domain; if it falls under a bad 
metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind which is such that it has no 
43 A similar argument may be given for thought-of mere possibilia, since there is a criterion of identity for 
such entities as well. Cf. Zalta (1988:32) and Priest (2005:115). 
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